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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(Supp. 
1988), the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
matter. This appeal is taken from a final Order and Judgment 
rendered by the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
State of Utah, following a bench trial held pursuant to 
stipulation on written pleadings and evidence, which wrongfully 
denied Motor Cargo an excess premium credit of $56,931.00. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a 
matter of law that the Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement - Plan III was clear and unambiguous in that it 
denied appellant Motor Cargo an excess premium refund? 
2. Did the Trial Court err when it concluded as a 
matter of law that the denial of appellant Motor Cargo's right 
to receive an excess premium refund under the Retrospective 
Premium Determination Agreement - Plan III did not constitute 
an unlawful forfeiture? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondent Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") 
brought this action against appellant Motor Cargo ("Motor 
Cargo") to collect on amounts allegedly due TIE under a 
Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement - Plan III 
("Retro Agreement B") entered into between the parties. The 
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in the Trial 
Court below. The Trial Court granted TIE'S Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to its First Cause of Action, while denying it 
Summary Judgment on its Second Cause of Action. In addition, 
the Trial Court denied Motor Cargo's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on its Counterclaim, but granted Motor Cargo leave to 
amend. As part of its Order and Judgment, the Trial Court 
stayed execution on the Judgment until all remaining claims 
asserted by the parties were fully adjudicated. 
On the remaining claims and accompanying issues not 
resolved by the above Order and Judgment, and pursuant to Rule 
39(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
trial was held on stipulated facts, affidavits of the parties, 
the Summary Judgment and other memoranda in support of the 
various positions of the parties. The Trial Court thereafter 
issued its Memorandum Decision, granting judgment in favor of 
TIE on its First and Second Causes of Action, less a partial 
setoff by Motor Cargo for credits held by TIE, and dismissing 
Motor Cargo's First Cause of Action in its Amended Counterclaim 
asserting an excess premium refund of $56,931.00 to which Motor 
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Cargo is entitled and which is confirmed by TIE'S own records. 
The Trial Court held that this Order and Judgment superseded 
its Summary Judgment noted above, and subsequently made and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings 
and Conclusions"). 
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Trial Court 
specifically concluded as a matter of law that Retro Agreement 
B was clear and unambiguous and entitled TIE to judgment in the 
amount of $68,394.00, plus interest, together with attorneys' 
fees in the amount of $14,500.00. In addition, the Trial Court 
made conclusions of law concerning the material provisions in 
Retro Agreement B upon which it based its decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Motor Cargo is a Utah trucking company and common 
carrier with its principal place of business in North Salt 
Lake, Utah. (R. 24.) 
2. TIE is an insurer in the State of Utah which 
specializes in writing insurance policies for common carriers 
such as Motor Cargo. (R. 1.) 
3. Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and 
the terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 
1979, designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement - Plan III" ("Retro Agreement A"), TIE issued its 
policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the "Policy") to Motor 
Cargo, having an effective date of March 1, 1979. (R. 389.) 
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4. From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of 
Retro Agreement A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance 
coverage to Motor Cargo. (R. 390.) 
5. At Motor Cargo's request, the Policy was renewed 
for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1, 1982, 
and a second Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement -
Plan III ("Retro Agreement B") was executed by the parties. 
Id. A true and accurate copy of Retro Agreement B is attached 
as Exhibit "C" to the Complaint. (R. 11-14.) 
6. Retro Agreement B, signed by the parties on 
March 2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement A except for 
certain percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro 
Agreement B. (R. 6-9, 11-14.) 
7. The Retro Agreements generally provide for a 
basic premium which Motor Cargo was required to pay on a 
monthly basis, but which allow adjustments to that premium by 
way of additional payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds 
to Motor Cargo for any excess payments. Id. 
8. Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements 
provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final 
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of 
the Policy. Retrospective rating is designed to benefit an 
insured with a good loss experience record. (R. 391.) 
9. Determining premiums retrospectively in the 
manner set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits the insured 
by allowing it the option of partial self-insurance, and 
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because of the retrospective retention, of achieving broader 
insurance coverage at a reduced cost compared to the premium 
for similar coverage under a standard policy. Id. 
10. Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B clearly 
establishes a right in both TIE and Motor Cargo to cancel the 
Policy prior to expiration of the term. Specifically, para-
graph 16(a) provides that if Motor Cargo cancels the Policy, 
the premium due TIE "shall be computed in accordance with the 
other provisions" of Retro Agreement B, but that at a minimum, 
the premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic 
Premium, whichever is the greater. (R. 14.) 
11. Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B provides, among 
other things, that Motor Cargo would be refunded, periodically 
throughout the term of the Policy, any excess premium paid to 
TIE. Paragraph 13 in relevant part, states: 
ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the 
Retrospective Premium at the 60-day, 
6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month 
periods, and provided the Retrospective 
Premium for the term of this agreement is 
less than all premium paid to the Exchange 
upon said policy, the Exchange shall, after 
each such computation . . . refund such 
excess premium to the Insured at such time 
and in the manner requested, . . . . 
(R. 13.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
12. On February 28, 1983, Motor Cargo exercised its 
right of cancellation under paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B 
by giving written notice to TIE of its intention to cancel all 
insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE, 
including the Policy. (R. 15.) 
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13. In accordance with the notice of cancellation, 
TIE cancelled the Policy as of February 28, 1983. (R. 16.) 
14. Following cancellation of the Policy, TIE 
submitted a premium report to Motor Cargo dated September 30, 
1985 which, in accordance with paragraph 13, showed that Motor 
Cargo was entitled to a premium refund of $56,931.00. A copy 
of the premium report is attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of William K. Maxwell. (R. 180.) 
15. Following submission of the premium report to 
Motor Cargo, TIE sent Motor Cargo a final invoice showing a 
premium due of $68,394.00. The invoice, however, failed to 
credit Motor Cargo for the excess premium refund of $56,931.00 
rightfully due Motor Cargo under paragraph 13 and confirmed by 
the premium report previously submitted by TIE. (R. 392-93.) 
A copy of the final invoice is attached as Exhibit "G" to the 
Affidavit of Paul J. Semons. (R. 169.) 
16. Motor Cargo took issue with TIE'S calculation of 
the premium due under Retro Agreement B. Thereafter, on 
October 12, 1983, TIE filed a Complaint against Motor Cargo to 
recover the above amounts allegedly due under the Retro 
Agreements. (R. 1-16.) 
17. Following discovery, the parties filed cross 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 135-72, 173-74, 181-97.) 
18. Following the Trial Court's ruling on the cross 
motions for summary judgment, the parties submitted for trial 
the resolution of Motor Cargo's First Cause of Action in its 
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Amended Counterclaim concerning all premium refunds due to 
Motor Cargo under Retro Agreement B. 
19. Following trial, the Trial Court, having reviewed 
the stipulated facts,1 affidavits of the parties, memoranda 
in support of the various positions of the parties and 
arguments of counsel, issued its Memorandum Decision holding 
that Retro Agreement B did not entitle Motor Cargo to a premium 
refund of $56,931.00 under the Policy. (R. 335-40.) 
20. Following its decision, the Trial Court entered 
its Findings and Conclusions (R. 388-97.) For the purposes of 
this appeal, the following Conclusions of Law are material: 
a. The Court is required to look to the terms 
of the contract and their plain meaning on questions 
of interpretation. Only when the Court, finds the 
contract to be ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn 
to the general rules of construction, i.e. favoring 
specific provisions over general, first dated pro-
visions over later, and construction against the 
scrivener. 
b. Paragraph 4(b) of [Retro Agreement B] 
defines the Basic Premium as being 76.42% of the 
Standard Premium. Paragraph 4(a) defines the 
"Standard Premium" as the premium established in 
the Policy. 
1
 The parties, pursuant to Rule 39(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, entered into a Stipulation on or about 
December 16, 1987, basically setting forth the facts stipulated 
to for the purpose of the trial. The affidavit, motions, and 
memoranda in support of the various positions of the parties 
were attached as exhibits to the Stipulation. Due to reasons 
unknown by Motor Cargo, the Stipulation, although relied upon 
by the Trial Court in making its decision, is not part of the 
record on appeal. Thus, Motor Cargo refers the Court to the 
Addendum at the end of this brief which incorporates the 
Stipulation as part of the record on appeal. See Addendum, 
infra. 
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c. Paragraph 4(f) of the Agreement defines 
"Retrospective Premium" as: 
The earned premium according to this 
agreement, computed as the sum of 
Incurred Losses, plus Service Fee, plus 
Premium Taxes, in no event to exceed 
the Standard Premium. 
d. Paragraph 12 of [Retro Agreement B] specifi-
cally provides how the Retrospective Premium is to be 
computed. 
e. Paragraph 13 of [Retro Agreement B] provides 
for adjustments to the premium for any excess premium 
under certain circumstances. 
f. Paragraph 16 of [Retro Agreement B] 
provides, among other things, that either party may 
cancel on thirty (30) days written notice and that the 
premium of cancellation prior to the end of the term 
shall be computed in accordance with the other 
provisions of [Retro Agreement B], subject to the 
additional provisions in Paragraph 16. 
g. One of the additional provisions of Para-
graph 16 provides, in part, that if the insured can-
cels, the minimum earned premium shall be 110% of the 
Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is greater. 
h. [Retro Agreement B] specifically defines 
Basic Premium and Retrospective Premium and the manner 
of their calculation. Any adjustments thereto provided 
in [Retro Agreement B] are not included in the defini-
tion of those terms nor in their calculation. 
i. Paragraph 16 specifically makes any manner 
of calculation in [Retro Agreement B] subject to the 
provisions of subparagraph 16(a) which specifically 
establishes the minimum earned premium upon cancella-
tion at 110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic 
Premium, whichever is greater. This paragraph makes 
no mention of any adjustments to these calculations, 
nor that there is to be a penalty of 10% of any 
premium so adjusted. 
j. Based upon the foregoing, the Court con-
cludes that [Retro Agreement B] under its terms is 
clear and unambiguous and that the earned premium on 
cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, is equal to 
110% of the Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium, 
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant to Para-
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graph 4, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c); Paragraph 
12, and Paragraph 16 of [Retro Agreement B]. 
k. TIE is entitled to judgment on its Second 
Cause of Action against Motor Cargo for the sum of 
$13,960.00, i.e. 10% of the Basic Premium of 
$139,600.00, less a credit of $16,530.00 due the 
defendant as shown on TIE'S final invoice with the 
difference between those sums, namely $2,570.00, to be 
allowed as a credit against the principal amount of 
$70,964.00 awarded against Motor Cargo in the Summary 
Judgment dated February 25, 1987, on TIE'S First Cause 
of Action, leaving a total principal amount owed by 
Motor Cargo to TIE on both causes of action of 
$68,394.00. 
1. Because Motor Cargo's amended counterclaim 
has been dismissed and it is entitled to recover 
nothing thereby or by way of setoff or defenses in 
accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Summary Judgment 
dated February 25, 1987, TIE is entitled to accruing 
interest on the sum of $68,394.00 at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum from February 25, 1988, until 
judgment is entered based upon the foregoing Findings 
and Conclusions. In addition, and as part of the 
judgment, Motor Cargo should be awarded reasonable 
attorneys' fees amounting to $14,500.00 and its costs 
incurred herein amounting to $60.00. 
(R. 393-97.) (Emphasis supplied). 
21. On February 13, 1989, the Trial Court entered its 
Order and Judgment in accordance with its Conclusions of Law. 
(R. 398-99.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court erred when it 
concluded that Retro Agreement B was clear, unambiguous, and 
dictated that Motor Cargo was not entitled to an excess premium 
refund. In reaching its decision, the Trial Court incorrectly 
relied upon specific provisions while ignoring others, as 
opposed to harmonizing all provisions to reach a fair and 
equitable result. Utah courts have clearly established that 
-9-
contracts must be construed as a whole and, where possible, 
given meaning and effect to all provisions. Specifically, the 
Trial Court failed to give due effect to paragraph 13 of Retro 
Agreement B which specifically provides Motor Cargo with a 
right to a premium refund if revealed by an audit conducted by 
TIE periodically during the term of the Policy. There is no 
language anywhere in Retro Agreement B specifically excluding 
Motor Cargo's right to an excess premium refund in the event of 
cancellation by Motor Cargo. Moreover, Motor Cargo's own 
records reveal an excess premium refund due Motor Cargo in the 
amount of $56,931.00. Based on the Trial Court's errant 
interpretation of Retro Agreement B and its failure to apply 
fundamental rules of construction, Motor Cargo was wrongfully 
denied an excess premium refund clearly and unequivocally 
called for by paragraph 13. 
In the alternative, the Trial Court's interpretation 
of Retro Agreement B recognized an ambiguity concerning the 
interplay and relationship between paragraphs 16 and 13 in the 
event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. Utah courts construe 
ambiguities in insurance contracts strictly against the insurer 
and liberally in favor of the insured. Thus, the Trial Court 
further erred when it resolved any ambiguities in paragraphs 16 
and 13 in favor of TIE. 
Finally, the Trial Court erred when it concluded that 
Motor Cargo's denial of a refund did not constitute an unlawful 
forfeiture. Utah courts recognize that a contract cannot be 
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construed to require a forfeiture unless such a result is clear 
and unequivocally demanded by the terms of the contract. Retro 
Agreement B does not contain or even purport to contain a 
"clear and unequivocal" forfeiture clause denying Motor Cargo's 
right to an excess premium refund upon cancellation. The Trial 
Court's decision has resulted in a harsh and inequitable 
forfeiture of Motor Cargo's premium refund while unjustly 
awarding TIE with a windfall. It is clear that in the event of 
cancellation under Retro Agreement B, the reasonable 
expectations of the parties did not encompass a waiver of Motor 
Cargo's right to an excess premium refund. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
reverse the Trial Court's judgment denying Motor Cargo's First 
Cause of Action in its Amended Counterclaim and credit Motor 
Cargo with a setoff in the amount of $56,931.00. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE FULL 
EFFECT AND MEANING TO ALL PROVISIONS IN 
RETRO AGREEMENT B. 
A. This Appeal Presents a Question of 
Law Concerning the Interpretation 
of a Contract. Thus, This Court 
Must Make its Own Independent 
Interpretation of Retro Agreement 
B and Accord No Deference to the 
Trial Court's Interpretation. 
In its final analysis, the Trial Court interpreted 
Retro Agreement B as a matter of law, without reference to or 
reliance upon any extrinsic evidence. Consequently, this Court 
should not accord any particular weight or deference to the 
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Trial Court's interpretation. Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick 
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986); Jones v. 
Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Big Cottonwood Tanner 
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Utah App. 
1987); Craig Food Industries, Inc. v. Weihing, 746 P.2d 279, 
283 (Utah App. 1987). This Court should instead "make its own 
independent interpretation of the contract terms." Big 
Cottonwood Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1359 (guoting Jones v. Hinkle, 
611 P.2d at 735); see also Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 
1149, 1150 (Utah 1986). Applying the above standard of review 
to the case at bar, this Court must make its own independent 
interpretation and construction of Retro Agreement B in order 
to determine the correctness of the Trial Court's decision 
below. 
B. The Trial Court Ignored the Plain 
Meaning of Retro Agreement B When 
it Held That Paragraph 13 Did Not 
Apply in the Event of Cancellation 
by Motor Cargo. 
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Trial Court 
specifically relied upon paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), 4(f), 12, and 
13 of Retro Agreement B in support of its decision. (R. 394-95.) 
Specifically, the Trial Court held that calculation of the 
premium under paragraph 16 only required the application of 
paragraphs 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 12, and paid mere "lip service" to 
paragraph 13. (R. 394-95.) 
Initially, it must be noted that the Trial Court 
committed a fundamental error when it held that it would apply 
general rules of construction concerning contracts "[o]nly when 
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the Court finds the contract to be ambiguous or inconsistent." 
(R. 393.) Utah case law dictates otherwise. Notwithstanding 
the absence of an ambiguity in a contract, Utah courts observe 
and apply the following general rules of construction: (1) 
insurance contracts should generally be construed as a whole 
without ignoring any specific parts thereof, Fuller v. Director 
of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah 1985); see also Minshew 
v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978); Big 
Cottonwood Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1359, and (2) all provisions in 
an insurance contract should be given proper effect and 
meaning, including the consideration of each provision in 
connection with the others. Fuller, 694 P.2d at 1048; Chevron 
Oil, 575 P.2d at 194; Big Cottonwood Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1359; 
see also Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d at 735. 
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it 
failed to follow the fundamental rules of construction noted 
above in interpreting Retro Agreement B. A proper application 
of these rules dictates giving full meaning and effect to para-
graph 13,2 something the Trial Court simply chose not to do. 
2
 Paragraph 13 in relevant part, states: 
ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the Retrospective 
Premium at the 60-day, 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and 
36-month periods, and provided the Retrospective Premium 
for the term of this agreement is less than all premium 
paid to the Exchange upon said policy, the Exchange shall, 
after each such computation . . . refund such excess 
premium to the Insured at such time and in the manner 
requested, . . . ." 
(R. 13.) (Emphasis supplied.) 
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The language of paragraph 16 in Retro Agreement B 
specifically makes reference, without qualification, to all 
other premium computation provisions found in the agreement. 
Paragraph 16 in relevant part, states: 
CANCELLATION. This agreement may be can-
celled by the Insured, or by the Exchange, 
at any time, by giving thirty days (30) 
advance written notice to the other party. 
The Exchange may cancel the agreement be-
cause of non-payment of premium by giving 
ten days (10) advance written notice to the 
Insured. The premium for a cancellation 
prior to the end of the term of this agree-
ment shall be computed in accordance with 
the other provisions of this agreement, 
subject to the following additional provi-
sions . 
(a) Cancellation by the named Insured: 
In event of cancellation by the named 
Insured for any other reason, the 
minimum earned premium shall be 110% of 
the Retrospective or Basic Premium, 
whichever is the greater, but the 
amount so calculated shall not exceed 
the Standard Premium as defined in this 
agreement; . . . 
(R. 14.) (Emphasis added.) As paragraph 16 indicates, the 
premium in the event of cancellation by the insured shall be 
computed "in accordance with the other provisions of this 
agreement, subject to the following additional provisions." 
Id. Thus, when determining the amount of a premium in the 
event of cancellation by the insured, the insurer must consider 
and apply all other premium computation provisions of the 
agreement, including paragraph 13, subject to the minimum 
earned premium amount set forth in paragraph 16(a). This the 
Trial Court clearly failed to do. Paragraph 16 does not 
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contain any language explicitly or implicitly excluding 
application of the excess premium refund provision of paragraph 
13 upon cancellation by the insured. Indeed, TIE incorporated 
paragraph 13 into paragraph 16 by drafting a general reference 
to the "other provisions" of the agreement. TIE now attempts 
to turn its back on this language in order to avoid paying an 
excess premium refund rightfully due Motor Cargo. 
As correctly noted by the Trial Court in its 
Conclusions of Law, courts are "required to look to the terms 
of the contract and their plain meaning on questions of 
interpretation." (R. 393.) (Emphasis added.) In construing 
paragraph 16, the Trial Court was called upon to interpret the 
plain meaning of the phrase "other provisions of this 
agreement." In determining the plain meaning of terms used in 
an insurance contract, Utah courts have relied upon Webster's 
dictionary as a primary source. See/ e.g., Fuller v. Director 
of Finance, 694 P.2d at 1047 (defining "damages"); Hoffman v. 
Life Insurance Company Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 416 
(Utah 1983) (defining "expect"). The term "other," as used in 
paragraph 16, is defined by Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary, p. 835 (1988) as "being the other one or ones 
distinct from that or those first mentioned or implied." Based 
on this definition, it is apparent that the parties intended 
and reasonably expected the phrase "other provisions of this 
agreement" in paragraph 16 to be broad and expansive to include 
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paragraph 13, as opposed to the narrow and selective inter-
pretation given by the Trial Court. 
Paragraph 13 clearly applies to the insurer's 
computation of the premium during periodic times throughout the 
term of the Policy, including 12 months after the renewal date, 
which is exactly what transpired in the present action.3 In 
direct contravention to the express language of paragraph 16 
and fundamental rules of construction, the Trial Court 
selectively applied the computation provisions of paragraphs 
4(a), 4(b), 4(f), and 12, while paying mere "lip service" to 
paragraph 13, when determining the correct amount of the 
premium. The Trial Court's Conclusion of Law that the premium 
refund provision of paragraph 13 had application only "under 
certain circumstances" avoids the gravamen of this appeal to 
determine specifically under what circumstances paragraph 13 
applies, which Motor Cargo contends includes cancellation under 
paragraph 16. The Trial Court's failure to thoroughly analyze 
those "circumstances" and apply them to the case at bar 
provides no guidance to this Court on appeal. (R. 394.) 
It is clearly established that Motor Cargo, in strict 
accordance with the cancellation procedure set forth in para-
3
 Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B clearly dictates that, at 
specific time periods throughout the term of the Policy, TIE is 
obligated to refund any excess premium previously paid by Motor 
Cargo. Paragraph 13 does not contain any language expressly or 
implicitly negating its application in the event of cancella-
tion by Motor Cargo. To the contrary, the express language of 
paragraph 13 mandates that TIE is obligated to refund to Motor 
Cargo, 12 months into the term of the Policy, for any excess 
premium due. 
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graph 16, terminated the Policy 12 months after it had been 
extended. (R. 392,) Thus, in accordance with paragraph 13, 
Motor Cargo was entitled to an excess premium refund, if any, 
at the end of the 12-month period. As the record below clearly 
demonstrates, TIE submitted a premium report to Motor Cargo 
which reflected an excess premium due Motor Cargo in the amount 
of $56/931.00. (R. 180.) As such, Motor Cargo was clearly 
entitled to a setoff in the amount of $56,931.00 against any 
sums owed to TIE as a result of cancellation. 
Moreover, paragraph 16 likewise does not contain any 
language expressly or implicitly negating the application of 
paragraph 13 in the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo.4 
In fact, paragraph 16, as discussed above, makes a general 
reference to paragraph 13. The Trial Court's holding that 
cancellation by Motor Cargo under paragraph 16 waives any right 
to a refund under paragraph 13, in effect, takes away Motor 
Cargo's freedom of choice under paragraph 16 to cancel the 
Policy. That is, Motor Cargo's choice of cancelling the Policy 
4
 In its Conclusions of Law, the Trial Court, in support of 
its conclusion that paragraph 13 had no application upon 
cancellation by Motor Cargo, noted that paragraph 16 "makes no 
mention of any adjustments to these calculations, nor that 
there is a penalty of 10% of any premium so adjusted." (R. 
395.) This conclusion is a non-sequitur. The absence of any 
language in paragraph 16 expressly negating application of 
paragraph 13 in the event of cancellation does not override 
paragraph 16's express reference to "other provisions" in Retro 
Agreement B in computing the premium upon cancellation. The 
Trial Court's conclusion has the effect of negating an express 
provision through implication, a principle which Motor Cargo 
contends is both illogical and lacking in case support. 
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and consequently waiving any right to an excess premium refund 
is really no choice at all, leaving insureds such as Motor 
Cargo effectively "locked in" throughout the term of the 
Policy. Such an interpretation of paragraph 16 is nonsensical 
and well beyond the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
Moreover, this interpretation unjustly awards the insurer with 
a windfall upon cancellation by the insured. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that 
paragraphs 16 and 13 were intended by the parties to operate in 
conjunction with each other. That is, paragraph 13, where an 
excess premium is revealed, must be applied when determining 
the earned premium under paragraph 16. The parties clearly did 
not intend that cancellation under paragraph 16 waives all 
rights under paragraph 13 as adopted by the Trial Court. 
Indeed, TIE'S own premium report sent to Motor Cargo showed an 
excess premium of $56,931.00 paid by Motor Cargo. The 
interpretation of paragraphs 16 and 13 forwarded by TIE and 
accepted by the Trial Court below are patently disingenuous and 
should be rejected by this Court. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, RETRO AGREEMENT B 
PRESENTED THE TRIAL COURT WITH AN 
AMBIGUITY WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS DRAFTER, TIE. 
At worst, the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions 
acknowledges an ambiguity concerning the interplay of 
paragraphs 13 and 16 in the event of cancellation by Motor 
Cargo which must be construed strictly against TIE as the 
drafter of Retro Agreement B and liberally in favor of Motor 
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Cargo as the insured. Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479; see 
also Utah Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons, 
665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983) (affirming summary judgment in 
favor of an insured against its insurer). Utah courts have 
found the above doctrine particularly applicable to the 
interpretation of insurance contracts, Utah Farm Bureau, 665 
P.2d at 1309, and where the ambiguity could have easily been 
avoided. Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479 (drafter could have 
avoided ambiguity by simply adding an additional phrase to the 
provision in dispute). 
A. Paragraph 16 is Ambiguous in That 
it Fails to Define What is Meant 
by the Phrase "Computed in Accor-
dance with the Other Provisions of 
This Agreement, Subject to the 
Following Additional Provisions." 
In order to uphold the Trial Court's decision denying 
Motor Cargo's Counterclaim, this Court must find that, in the 
event of cancellation by the insured, the language of paragraph 
16 clearly and unequivocally negates the application of para-
graph 13 in computing the earned premium. As discussed above, 
there is no language anywhere in paragraphs 13, 16, or any 
other provision in the agreement to such effect. Thus, it is 
arguably ambiguous as to what is meant by "other provisions" as 
used in paragraph 16. See supra, quoting paragraph 16, p. 14. 
Moreover, it is equally unclear what is meant by the phrase 
"subject to the following additional provisions" as used in 
paragraph 16. _Id. The Trial Court below apparently con-
strued the above language to mean that paragraph 13 would apply 
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only "under certain circumstances." (R. 394.) However, the 
Trial Court failed to define what "circumstances" required the 
application of paragraph 13. It is thus unclear from the 
Conclusions of Law made by the Trial Court below concerning the 
application of paragraph 13 in the event of cancellation under 
paragraph 16. 
As noted above, the principle of construing a contract 
against its scrivener in the event of an ambiguity is appro-
priately applied where the ambiguity could have easily been 
avoided. Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479. In the case at 
bar, TIE could have easily avoided any ambiguity raised by the 
terms "other" and "subject to" in paragraph 16 by simply 
inserting additional language which would have clearly put 
Motor Cargo on notice of the inapplicability of paragraph 13 in 
the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo.5 TIE'S failure to 
do so, however, must result in construing the above ambiguities 
in favor of Motor Cargo and against TIE as drafter of Retro 
Agreement B. Accordingly, upon written cancellation of the 
Policy by Motor Cargo, TIE should have applied paragraph 13 
when computing the earned premium. 
5
 For example, TIE could have easily inserted the following 
provision at the end of Paragraph 13: "The Insured waives its 
right to receive a credit or refund of any excess premium when 
it elects to cancel the policy pursuant to the cancellation 
provisions of paragraph 16." In addition, TIE could have easily 
inserted the following provision at the end of the first com-
plete paragraph of paragraph 16: "However, the Insured is ad-
vised that in the event it exercises its right of cancellation 
under this Policy, it specifically waives its right to receive 
a credit or refund of any excess premium, as provided for under 
paragraph 13." 
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In summary, the Trial Court failed to give full effect 
and meaning to paragraph 13 when determining the proper earned 
premium amount under Retro Agreement B. There is no express 
language in paragraphs 13, 16 or any other provision expressly 
or implicitly negating Motor Cargo's right to receive a refund 
of excess premiums paid under the Policy. In the alternative, 
paragraphs 13 and 16 create an ambiguity which must be construed 
against TIE resulting in a premium refund to Motor Cargo. Under 
both the clear and unambiguous language of Retro Agreement B or 
in the event of an ambiguity, Motor Cargo is entitled to a 
reversal of the Trial Court's ruling against it on its 
counterclaim to recover the excess premium paid under Retro 
Agreement B. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE MOTOR 
CARGO'S DENIAL OF EXCESS PREMIUMS DUE 
AN UNLAWFUL FORFEITURE. 













ro Agreement B 
In its Findings and Conclusions, the Trial Court did 
not resolve the issue of whether or not, as a matter of law, 
TIE'S denial to Motor Cargo of an excess premium refund 
constituted an unlawful forfeiture. Thus, this Court should 
apply the same standard of review accorded to the Trial Court's 
ruling on the interpretation of Retro Agreement B. That is, 
this Court must make its own independent interpretation as to 
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whether or not the acts taken by TIE in the case at bar 
constituted an unlawful and unconscionable forfeiture.6 
B„ Utah Courts Have Consistently Held 
That Forfeitures Should Not be 
Declared Unless Such a Result is 
Called For by the Clear and 
Unequivocal Language in the 
Contract. 
As a general rule, "[f]orfeitures are not favored, and 
in interpreting an agreement, every reasonable presumption 
should be indulged against an intention to allow a forfeiture." 
Green v. Palfreyman, 166 P.2d 215, 219, reh'g denied, opinion 
amended on other grounds, 175 P.2d 213 (Utah 1946) (emphasis 
supplied). Moreover, Utah courts have consistently held that a 
forfeiture should not be enforced unless the terms of an 
agreement are clear and unequivocal. Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 
28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 1972); First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 
1983). Finally, the courts have held that "where there is a 
choice, an interpretation which will bring about an equitable 
result will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable one." 
Wingets, 500 P.2d at 1010 (footnote omitted). Application of 
the above principles to the case at bar clearly dictates a 
6
 The Utah Supreme Court has defined "forfeiture" as "the 
involuntary or forced loss of [a] right, caused by the failure 
of the appropriator or owner to do or perform some act." 
Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894, 900 (Utah 1937). In the case 
at bar, Motor Cargo's involuntary relinquishment of its right 
to an excess premium refund purportedly caused by its early 
cancellation under paragraph 16 constituted a "forfeiture" as 
defined in Hammond. 
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reversal of the Trial Court's denial of Motor Cargo1s motion 
for summary judgment on its Amended Counterclaim. 
C. The Clear and Unambiguous Language 
of Retro Agreement B Does Not Call 
for Forfeiture of Motor Cargo's 
Premium Refund to Which it was 
Entitled. 
As discussed above in Section I.B., the clear and 
unequivocal language of paragraphs 16 and 13 of Retro Agreement 
B called for an excess premium refund to Motor Cargo under the 
agreement. Conversely, it is clear that paragraphs 16 and 13 
do not "clearly and unequivocally" negate an insured's right to 
an excess premium refund in the event of cancellation under the 
agreement. Moreover, the clear and unambiguous language of 
paragraphs 13 and 16 do not call for a forfeiture under the 
instant facts or under any other circumstances. Following the 
strong policy enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Green 
disfavoring forfeitures, it must reasonably be presumed that in 
light of paragraphs 16 and 13, the parties did not intend to 
allow a forfeiture in the event of cancellation of the Policy 
by Motor Cargo. 
TIE seeks this Court's affirmance of the harsh, ine-
quitable forfeiture taken against Motor Cargo. Notwithstanding 
its retention of the excess premiums due Motor Cargo, TIE has 
been reimbursed for all of its out-of-pocket expenses and 
allocated overhead, including a ten percent (10%) penalty in 
the amount of $13,960.00. (R. 169.) Yet, notwithstanding 
TIE'S recouping of its expenses, contractual profits, and an 
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additional penalty of nearly $14,000.00, TIE continues to 
wrongfully retain the $56,931.00 in excess premiums which its 
own records show was overpaid by Motor Cargo. (R. 180.) In 
other words, TIE seeks affirmance of the Trial Court's improper 
and unlawful awarding of a windfall to TIE. A denial to Motor 
Cargo of the excess premium to which it is rightfully entitled 
under Retro Agreement B is unjustly harsh and flies in the face 
of the clear and unambiguous language of paragraphs 16 and 13, 
as well as strong public policy recognized in Utah disfavoring 
forfeitures. 
In summary, the clear and unequivocal language of 
Retro Agreement B does not dictate a waiver of Motor Cargo's 
right to an excess premium refund. TIE has clearly received 
all of its out-of-pocket expenses, plus an additional penalty 
assessed against Motor Cargo. Motor Cargo is thus entitled to 
a reversal of the Trial Court with respect to its Amended 
Counterclaim. An affirmance of the Trial Court would not only 
cut against the clear and express language of Retro Agreement B 
and the law of forfeitures, but would additionally provide TIE 
with an undeserved windfall. The parties never envisioned such 
a harsh and inequitable result at the time the agreement was 
entered. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court below clearly erred when it failed to 
give due meaning and effect to the premium refund provision of 
paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B. Consequently, the Trial 
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Court wrongfully awarded TIE, in addition to its out-of-pocket 
expenses and a profit, the excess premium refund rightfully due 
Motor Cargo. There is no "clear and unequivocal" language in 
paragraphs 13, 16, or any other provision in Retro Agreement B 
authorizing this harsh and inequitable forfeiture against Motor 
Cargo. Moreover, Utah case law prohibits forfeitures under 
similar circumstances. Based on the clear and unambiguous 
language of Retro Agreement B, it is apparent that the 
reasonable expectations of the parties did not encompass a 
forfeiture in the event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. 
Even assuming the existence of an ambiguity raise by 
paragraphs 13 and 16, the agreement should be construed against 
TIE as scrivener, resulting in an excess premium refund to 
Motor Cargo. TIE could have easily inserted language in both 
paragraphs 13 and 16 which would have clearly put Motor Cargo 
on notice of its limited rights in the event of cancellation. 
However, TIE failed to do so. 
Based on the foregoing, Motor Cargo respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's denial of 
its counterclaim and enter judgment entitling Motor Cargo to 
the excess premium refund wrongfully retained by TIE. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of May, 1989. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Motor Cargo, through this Addendum, submits the 
attached Stipulation entered into between the parties on or 
about December 16, 1987. Due to reasons unknown by Motor 
Cargo, the Stipulation, although relied upon by the Trial Court 
below in rendering its decision, is not part of the record on 
appeal. Thus, Motor Cargo submits the following Stipulation as 
part of the record on appeal. 
As part of the Stipulation, the parties attached as 
exhibits all affidavits, motions and memoranda in support of 
the various positions of the parties. All of the aforemen-
tioned documents are currently part of the record on appeal. 
Thus, in order to avoid redundancy, the exhibits are not 
submitted as part of the Stipulation. 
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GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX 
& BENDINGER 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 








Civil No. 34602 
The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"), by 
and through its attorneys of record, Mazuran, Verhaaren & 
Hayes, P.C., and the defendant, Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation 
("Motor Cargo"), by and through its attorneys of record, 
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger, herewith stipulate and 
agree as follows: 
1. The issues in this proceeding not heretofore 
resolved by the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 
25, 1987, other than Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and 
interference with contract and business advantage, are herewith 
submitted to the Court for trial and judgment pursuant to Rules 
39(b) and 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon the 
Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits supporting and opposing 
summary judgment previously submitted, and upon the facts 
stipulated below. For the Court's convenience, said Motions, 
Memoranda and Affidavits, and the Judgment and Order of the 
Court, are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits 
MAW_ through _"NH. 
2. Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and 
interference with contract and business advantages are severed 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and trial on 
those claims is hereby deferred to a date to be set in the 
future. 
3. The following facts are stipulated for the 
purposes of trial and the Court is to determine the other facts 
based on the memoranda, affidavits and exhibits previously 
referred to: 
(a) TIE is and at all times material to its 
Complaint in this matter was duly licensed to conduct the 
business of an insurer in the State of Utah. 
(b) Motor Cargo at all times material to TIE'S 
Complaint maintained its principal place of business in North 
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah. 
(c) Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo 
and the terms of an agreement between the parties dated 
March 1, 1979, designated as "Retrospective Premium 
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Determination Agreement — Plan III" ("Retro-Agreement—A"), 
TIE issued its policy of insurance No, 6120-00-40 (the 
"Policy-) to Motor Cargo having an effective date of March 1, 
1979. A copy of Retro Agreement—A is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "0". 
(d) From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the 
term of Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, the plaintiff 
provided insurance coverage for Motor Cargo. 
(e) At the request of Motor Cargo, the Policy 
was renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on 
March 1, 1982 and a second Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement—Plan III ("Retro Agreement—B") was executed by the 
parties. A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "PH. 
(f) One year later, on or about February 28, 
1983, Motor Cargo gave the plaintiff written notice to cancel 
all insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and 
TIE, including the Policy. 
(g) In accordance with Motor Cargo's Notice of 
Cancellation, TIE cancelled the Policy effective February 28, 
1983. 
(h) A copy of the final "Retrospective Premium 
Reports" dated September 30, 1985 is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"Q" . 
4. Attorneys' Fees, if any are awarded by the Court, 
may be proved in accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of 
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Practice of this Court, or in such other manner as the Court 
may order• ^ 
Dated this day of December, 1987. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
i r o l a C . K Verhaaren v— 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX 
& BENDINGER 
By 
>y/D ./Gurmankm Jaj 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage 
prepaid thereon, this 25th day of May, 1989, to the following: 
Harold C. Verhaaren 
Mark F. Bell 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
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